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An important issue in risk analysis is the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. In 
this paper, the use of distinct representation formats for aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is 
advocated, the latter being modelled by sets of possible values. Modern uncertainty theories based on 
convex sets of probabilities are known to be instrumental for hybrid representations where aleatory 
and epistemic components of uncertainty remain distinct. Simple uncertainty representation 
techniques based on fuzzy intervals and p-boxes are used in practice. This paper outlines a risk 
analysis methodology from elicitation of knowledge about parameters to decision. It proposes an 
elicitation methodology where the chosen representation format depends on the nature and the amount 
of available information. Uncertainty propagation methods then blend Monte-Carlo simulation and 
interval analysis techniques. Nevertheless, results provided by these techniques, often in terms of 
probability intervals, may be too complex to interpret for a decision-maker and we therefore propose 
to compute a unique indicator of the likelihood of risk, called confidence index. It explicitly accounts 
for the decision-maker’s attitude in the face of ambiguity. This step takes place at the end of the risk 
analysis process, when no further collection of evidence is possible that might reduce the ambiguity 
due to epistemic uncertainty. This last feature stands in contrast with the Bayesian methodology, 
where epistemic uncertainties on input parameters are modelled by single subjective probabilities at 
the beginning of the risk analysis process. 
 
 




With the quest for sustainable development, the notion of risk is increasingly present in our 
collective psyche, as can be seen in public regulations regarding the management of water 
(e.g. OJEC 2000), soil (CEC 2006) or waste (OJEC 2008). Risk in such contexts can be 
defined as the combination of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesirable event and the 
severity of the damage that can be caused by the event (e.g., BSI 2007). In recent years, a 
clearer understanding of what can be expected from environmental risk assessments has 
emerged, with a shift from “risk-based” management (e.g., Vegter 2001) to “risk-informed” 
management (Burton et al. 2008; Pollard et al. 2002), whereby risk assessment is but one 
component of the decision-making process, to be combined with other criteria from a variety 
of fields, e.g., environmental, economic and social. Such a shift is primarily the result of a 
better awareness that decision-making in the environmental field is a multi-factor process and 
of the limitations of risk assessment due in particular to inherent uncertainties. 
In the last 10 years or so, the treatment of uncertainty in risk assessments has witnessed a 
shift of paradigm with the increasing awareness of the fundamental difference between 
stochastic and epistemic uncertainties (Hoffman and Hammonds 1994, Ferson 1996, Ferson 
and Ginzburg 1996, Guyonnet et al. 1999, Helton et al. 2004, Colyvan 2008). Stochastic (or 
aleatory) uncertainty arises from random variability related to natural processes such as the 
heterogeneity of population or the fluctuations of a quantity with time. Epistemic uncertainty 
arises from the incomplete/imprecise nature of available information. The pervasive confusion 
between these two types of uncertainties has been one of the most serious shortcomings in 
risk assessment.  
While stochastic uncertainty is adequately addressed using classical probability theory, 
several uncertainty theories have been developed in order to explicitly handle 
incomplete/imprecise information (see for instance the survey by Dubois and Prade 2009). 
Such developments in uncertainty theories provide new tools for faithfully representing the 
kind of poor information collected by practitioners in the environmental field. As a result, 
some risk analysts have felt the need to develop original computation schemes for jointly 
propagating information tainted with epistemic and stochastic uncertainties. Such joint 
propagation methods have been applied by a number of authors. For instance, Li et al. (2007) 
used an integrated fuzzy-stochastic approach in the assessment of the risk of groundwater 
contamination by hydrocarbons. Baraldi and Zio (2008) used a combined Monte Carlo and 
possibilistic (fuzzy) approach to propagate uncertainties in an event tree analysis of accident 
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sequences in a nuclear power plant in Taïwan. Li et al. (2008) used a fuzzy-stochastic 
modelling approach for estimating health risks from air pollution. Baccou et al. (2008) 
applied joint propagation methods for assessing the risk of radionuclide migration in the 
environment. Kentel and Aral (2005) compared 2D Monte Carlo and joint fuzzy and Monte 
Carlo propagation for calculating health risks, while Kentel (2006) applied such joint methods 
to groundwater resource management. Bellenfant et al. (2008) used another method (referred 
to as IRS in section 4 of this paper) to quantify risks of CO2 leakage following injection into 
deep geological deposits. 
Results of joint propagation methods, such as those developed by these authors, can 
typically be expressed by means of special “families” of probability distributions, as opposed 
to single distributions. They are delimited by an upper bound (a plausibility function in 
evidence theory) and a lower bound (a belief function) of the probability that risk might 
exceed or not a certain threshold. Compared to the result of a classical Monte Carlo analysis 
performed using subjective probability distributions for modelling incomplete/imprecise 
information, hybrid methods do not yield a unique estimate of the probability that risk should 
exceed or not a certain threshold. Although the very aim of these joint propagation methods is 
to promote consistency with available information and avoid assumptions of Bayesian 
methods (Dubois et al. 1996, Ben-Haim 2006), the use of probability intervals may become 
an impediment at the decision-making stage, since decision-makers may not feel comfortable 
with the notion of an imprecise probability of exceeding a threshold. In the Bayesian tradition, 
a single probability distribution is required in order to ensure a rational decision (Lindley 
1971). Such a probability distribution is supposed to reflect beliefs and is elicited as such 
from experts. On the contrary, the use of imprecise probabilities is supposed to reflect the 
actual objective information collected about a given risky process. Hence, from a Bayesian 
point of view, there is a gap between results provided by joint uncertainty propagation 
methods and the expected scientific judgment a risk analysis procedure should lead to (Aven 
2010).  
In this paper, we outline a complete risk-analysis methodology that maintains the 
difference between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties throughout the process, and propose a 
knowledge elicitation strategy to that effect. After proposing a unified outlook of modern 
uncertainty theories in Section 2, a general uncertainty elicitation methodology is outlined in 
section 3, whose main message is to adapt the choice of the representation tool to the richness 
of the available information. Basic joint uncertainty propagation techniques are then described 
in Section 4. In Section 5, we propose a subjective approach to circumvent the difficult issue 
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of deciding under incomplete information. The idea is to re-introduce the decision-maker’s 
subjectivity, in the style of Hurwicz criterion, by means of an optimism coefficient. This is 
done at the final decision-making stage, rather than at the uncertainty elicitation stage as is 
often the case with the Bayesian approach. Finally, an example of health risk calculation is 
presented in Section 6, as an illustration of the proposed decision methodology.  
2. THEORIES OF UNCERTAINTY TOLERATING 
INCOMPLETENESS 
There are basically three mathematical frameworks for the joint modelling of aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainty: convex probability sets, random sets and possibility theory (Dubois and 
Prade 2009). Dempster (1967) was among the first scholars to suggest articulating probability 
theory with a faithful representation of incomplete information, replacing a random variable 
by a multiple-valued mapping describing limited knowledge on the actual values it takes. 
Upper and lower probability bounds for events on the range of the random variable are then 
obtained. Shafer (1976) later interpreted these bounds as subjective plausibility and belief 
functions induced by incomplete unreliable evidence. The idea is to assign subjective 
probability weights to sets of possible values, instead of point values (as in classical 
probability functions). This random set formalism (Kendall 1974) thus allows a common 
framework for representing both types of uncertainty (epistemic and stochastic). In the so-
called possibility theory (Zadeh 1978, Dubois and Prade 1988) fuzzy set membership 
functions are used as primitive entities for representing incomplete information. Information 
items are then viewed as nested sets of possible values, which is particularly suitable for 
representing human-originated incomplete/imprecise information (Dubois 2006). It can be 
viewed as a computationally simple special case of the previous formalism, restricted to 
nested sets. Walley (1991) developed a more general imprecise probability theory whereby 
the issue of partial lack of probabilistic information is addressed by means of convex sets of 
probability functions. These convex sets can be used to represent incomplete information 
about a probabilistic model as in robust statistics (Huber 1981), or (this is Walley’s stance) as 




2.1 Imprecise probability 
Basically, an objective probabilistic representation is incomplete if a family of probability 
functions P is used in place of a single distribution P, because the available information is not 
sufficient for selecting a single one in P. Under such imperfect knowledge it is only possible 
to compute optimal bounds on the probability of measurable events A ⊆ S:  
P*(A) = sup{P(A) P∈ P }, P*(A) = inf{P(A) P∈ P }      (1) 
The upper bound P*(A) can be used to measure the degree of plausibility of A, evaluating 
to what extent A is not impossible, i.e., there is no reason against the occurrence of A. The 
lower bound P*(A) can be used to measure the degree of certainty of A. This is similar to the 
standard probabilistic framework where the degree of belief in an event is equated to its 
frequency of occurrence if the latter is available (this is the Hacking principle). 
It is obvious that P*(A) = 1 - P*(Ac), where Ac is the opposite event of A. It expresses the 
idea that an event A is certain if and only if its opposite is impossible. Each event A is then 
assigned an interval [P*(A), P*(A)], which is all the larger as information is lacking. In the 
face of ignorance, the consistent representation consists of using the trivial bounds [0, 1]. 
Reasoning with such bounds is generally not equivalent to using the set P because in general 
the set of probability functions respecting the bounds {P, P ≥ P*} = {P, P ≤ P*} is convex and 
strictly contains P (the notation P ≥ P* is short for ∀A ⊆ S, P(A) ≥ P* (A)). 
Conversely, imprecise probabilistic information may take the form of lower probability 
bounds P-(Ai) of specific events {Ai, i = 1, …k}. The value P-(Ai) can be understood either as 
a lower bound of the frequency of occurrence of Ai, as known by an agent, or as the subjective 
belief of this agent about the occurrence of Ai. In the latter case, belief is measured as the 
greatest buying price of a lottery ticket that some decision-maker accepts to pay in order to 
win 1$ if Ai occurs (Walley 1991). In order to make sense, these bounds must be such that the 
set P = {P, P(Ai) ≥ P-(Ai), i = 1, …k } is not empty (which is the no sure loss condition of 
Walley 1991). They must be optimal in the sense that best lower bounds P*(Ai) (as obtained 
from P via Eq. 1) should coincide with assessments P-(Ai) for all i = 1, …k (there is no point 
in buying the lottery tickets more than P-(Ai)). More generally, a lower envelope function P- is 
said to be coherent (according to Walley) if: 
P*(A) = inf{P(A), P ≥ P-} = P-(A), ∀A ⊆ S      (2) 
Note that this model of subjective belief is similar to subjective probability, but it differs 
from it on a basic issue: in the classical theory, P*(A) is also the least selling price of the 
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lottery ticket pertaining to the occurrence of event A. Here this selling price is just requested 
to be not less than P*(A) and it coincides with P*(A) = 1 − P*(Ac). The interval [P*(A), P*(A)] 
represents the amount of ignorance of the agent, i.e. to what extent this agent is reluctant to 
engage into a fair betting process (or a full-fledged probabilistic belief assessment). Like 
subjective probabilities, values P-(Ai) can be elicited; unlike subjective probabilities, they 
tolerate some amount of ignorance to be expressed. 
2.2 Possibility theory and set-valued representations 
An extreme example of such a representation is when all that is known is that some 
parameter x taking value on the space S is only known to belong to a subset E of S. Note that 
the set E is made of mutually exclusive elements, since each realization of x is unique. E is 
said to be a disjunctive set and represents an epistemic state. Then, Boolean plausibility and 
certainty functions can be respectively defined by: 
Π(A) = 1 if A∩E≠∅, and 0 otherwise;      (3) 
N(A) = 1−Π(Ac) = 1 if E⊆A and 0 otherwise.      (4) 
Clearly N(A) = 1 if and only if x ∈ A is implied by the available information (hence its 
certainty) while Π(A) = 1 if and only if x ∈ A is consistent with the available information. The 
associated probability set contains all probability functions with support inside set E: P = {P, 
P(E) =1}. Note that the statement “x∈ E,” represents subjective information about x. In the 
Bayesian framework, a probability distribution on E should be assigned. Using a mere set 
indicates that the agent refuses to buy lottery tickets pertaining to events A not implied by E 
(he assigns P-(A) = 0 to those events).  
A refined situation is when some elements in E are considered to be more plausible than 
others for x and degrees of possibility π(r)∈[0, 1] can be assigned to r ∈ E, with condition 
that π(r) = 0 if r ∉E and π(r) = 1 for at least one value r ∈ E. Plausibility and certainty 
functions can be respectively defined by means of so-called possibility and necessity 
measures (Dubois and Prade 1988) generalizing the above Boolean functions: 
Π(A) = sup r∈ A π(r); N(A) = 1−Π(Ac) = inf r∉ A 1− π(r)    (5) 
Interestingly, necessity functions are coherent in the sense of Walley, so that Π and N 
define a family of probability measures P(π) = {P, P ≥ N} such that Π = P* and N = P*, 
where P*(A) = inf{P(A), P ≥ N} (Dubois and Prade 1992).  
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2.3. Random disjunctive sets 
It is also possible to assign reliability weights m(Ei) to statements of the form “x∈Ei”, 
whereby m(Ei) expresses the probability that the statement “x∈Ei” accurately represents the 
available information (Shafer 1976). It is a de dicto probability, not to be confused with the de 
re probability of the occurrence of event Ei. Assuming a number k of such statements each 
having probability m(Ei), this approach comes down to considering a probability distribution 
m over the family of subsets E of S, such that m(Ø) = 0, and ∑E⊆ S m(E) = 1. This is what is 
usually called a random set1. The weight m(E) is the amount of probability that could be 
assigned to elements in E, but is not by lack of information. This is the randomized version of 
the plain incomplete information case “x∈E” (where then, m(E) = 1). Total ignorance is then 
when m(S) = 1. So called belief and plausibility functions are defined as: 
Bel(A) = ∑E⊆ A m(E) ; Pl(A) = 1 – Bel(A)c = ∑E∩A≠ Ø m(E)    (6) 
They obviously generalize Boolean functions in (3) and (4). They also generalize necessity 
and possibility measures in (5). The latter are obtained in the case of consonance, when the set 
F = {E, m(E) > 0} of focal subsets is nested, i.e. ∀E, E’∈ F , E ⊆E’ or E’⊆E. Then P = Pl 
and N = Bel, and the possibility distribution π is such that π(r) = Pl({r}). A unique probability 
function P is retrieved if all focal sets are singletons; then the mass function m is a probability 
distribution and Bel = Pl = P. Belief functions are coherent lower envelopes that exactly 
encode the convex set of probability measures P(m) = {P, P ≥ Bel}. A typical (consonant) 
case of a belief function is an unreliable testimony of the form “x∈E” where there is some 
probability p that the information is irrelevant. It defines a mass function such that m(E) = 1 – 
p and m(S) = p (when the information is irrelevant, it is useless). It comes down to a piece of 
information of the form P(E) ≥ 1 – p, i.e. a confidence set. Note that the mass function m can 
have a frequentist flavor (m(E) is then the frequency of imprecise outcomes of the form E) or 
a subjective flavor (m(E) is then the assigned subjective probability that E is the correct 
information). 
                                                 
1 A random disjunctive set, in fact. There is a branch of random set theory (Kendall, 1974) where the set-valued realizations represent 
objective entities (e.g. a shape to be located in some area). In contrast, in this paper, set-valued realizations are epistemic constructs 
representing incomplete information. 
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3.  TOWARD FAITHFUL REPRESENTATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
Possibly one of the most important reasons why alternative methods are needed for 
representing uncertainties in environmental risk assessments is the quest for consistency with 
available information. When an investigator, faced with incomplete/imprecise information, 
decides to overlook this partial lack of knowledge and resorts to postulating a unique 
subjective probability distribution function (PDF), he/she is arguably misrepresenting the 
available information. Indeed, there is then no formal difference between known stochastic 
variability and incomplete information as soon as objective and subjective probability 
distributions are jointly propagated. 
 
3.1 Practical representations 
Whilst known variability can be captured by precise probability distributions, we propose 
to use intervals and representations that refine them for consistently representing partial 
ignorance. Figure 1 is a flowchart that proposes to choose specific mathematical 
representations of information pertaining to a model parameter, according to the actually 
available information regarding this parameter, thus offering an elicitation strategy. The 
following simple uncertainty representations based on intervals or their generalisation are 
used in the flowchart: 
- an interval [a, b], such that the value of the parameter x under concern is supposed to 
lie in it.  
- a fuzzy interval (Dubois and Prade 1988), defined by a possibility distribution π : R → 
[0, 1], that assigns to each value r of x a degree of possibility π(r) ∈ [0, 1]. It is a 
generalized interval insofar as ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1], the cut set Iλ = {x, π(x) ≥ λ} is a closed 
interval, and the core I1 is not empty.  
- a p-box defined by a pair of (cumulative) probability distribution functions (PDF) (F*, 
F*) where F* > F*. It characterizes a family Ppbox of probability functions with PDFs F 
such that F* ≥ F ≥ F* (Williamson and Downs 1990).  
All of these representations correspond to special kinds of random intervals in the style of 
Dempster-Shafer. Namely, a fuzzy interval can be viewed as a multiple-valued mapping from 
[0, 1], equipped with the Lebesgue measure, to intervals, assigning a focal set Iλ to each λ ∈ 
(0, 1]. A fuzzy interval can also be viewed as a probability family. More precisely, each set Iλ 
can be viewed as a confidence interval containing the value of x with confidence at least 1−λ. 
That is, the possibility distribution π encodes the probability family: 
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P(π) = {P, P(Iλ) ≥ 1−λ, ∀λ∈(0, 1] }.  
As said above, the possibility measure Π induced by π  on events A satisfies:  
Π(A) = sup r∈ A π(r) = sup {P(A) P ∈ P (π)}. 
Very common in probability are inequalities of the form P(Iλ) ≥ 1−λ,  ∀λ∈(0, 1].   For 
instance Chebyshev inequality reads P(X ∈ [xmean – x, xmean + x]) ≥ 1 – σ2/x2, for x ≥ σ, where 
xmean is the mean and σ a standard deviation. Intervals of the form [xmean – x, xmean +x] define a 
fuzzy interval with core [xmean – σ, xmean +σ] and infinite support. This possibility distribution 
encodes a family containing all probability distributions with mean xmean and standard 
deviation σ. Likewise the triangular fuzzy interval with support [a, b] and mode c encodes a 
family containing all probability distributions with such mode and support lying in [a, b] 
(Baudrit and Dubois 2006).  
Another popular example of a set-valued probabilistic representation is a probability box 
(Ferson et al. 2003). A p-box is also a random interval, replacing the above intervals Iλ by 
other intervals of the form [F*-1(λ), F*-1(λ)]  playing the role of focal sets (Kriegler and Held 
2005, Destercke et al. 2008). It is possible to extract a p-box from a fuzzy interval, letting 
F*(r)=Π(x ≤ r) and F*(r)=Ν(x ≤ r). However, this is a special p-box such that F* (r) = 1 and 
F* (r) = 0 for some value r ∈ R (namely take r such that π(r) =1). In other words, this p-box 
contains a Dirac function. However this p-box contains less information than π because the 
probability set P(π) is strictly included in the probability family Ppbox induced by this p-box 
(Baudrit and Dubois 2006).  
Similarly, a p-box can be extracted from a random interval inducing belief and plausibility 
functions, considering F*(r) = Pl(x ≤ r) and F*(r) = Bel(x ≤ r). Again, this p-box is less 
informative than the random interval it is built from, and it is equivalent to another belief 
function. Indeed a random interval {([ai, bi], mi), i = 1,…,n} is equivalent to a p-box (i.e. they 
yield the same probability bounds for all events) if and only if the ordering of the lower 
bounds of intervals [ai, bi] is the same as the ordering of the upper bounds: ai ≤ aj if and only 
if bi ≤ bj. For instance, a set of measurements {ri, i = 1, …,k} with fixed error e, corresponding 
to focal intervals [ri-e, ri+e] yields a belief function that coincides with a p-box. More general 





3.2 An elicitation methodology 
The input point to the flowchart in Figure 1 considers whether or not the investigator 
wishes to represent a given risk model parameter by a deterministic quantity (i.e., not subject 
to variability). There may be several reasons for assuming a parameter should take on a fixed 
value. For example, the investigator may know that the value of the parameter is indeed a 
constant (e.g. the height of a chimney stack or the depth of a well); on the contrary he may 
know that he will never get information regarding the parameter’s variability (whether spatial 
or temporal); therefore he chooses to assume a constant value, albeit imprecisely known. 
Once the user of the flowchart has chosen whether he wishes to use a constant parameter 
value or not, he is guided through a series of questions that assist him in selecting an 
appropriate tool for representing the information available to him. 
If a representation by a constant parameter is selected, questions are asked in order to 
identify the degree of precision of this information regarding the parameter value. Questions 
go from the less to the more informed. First the user is asked whether he can identify an 
interval that contains the parameter value with certainty. If this is the only information that 
can be provided, then a simple interval [a, b] will be assigned to the parameter. If the user can 
express preferences within this interval, it can be refined into a trapezoidal or a triangular 
fuzzy set. In fact, an interval [a, b] and a plausible value r* therein (interpreted as the core of 
the fuzzy interval: π(r*) = 1) can be modelled as a triangular fuzzy interval. The 
corresponding probability set P(π) then contains, among other ones, all probability functions 
with unimodal density with support in [a, b] and mode r* (Baudrit and Dubois 2006). Instead 
of a plausible value, an interval thereof can be used as a core of a trapezoidal fuzzy interval. If 
the available information is not sufficient for defining a sensible interval containing some 
parameter, one may resort to considering a set of representative scenarios where assumptions 
can be stated, each leading to a sensible interval. 
If the user decides to consider the parameter as a random variable, he is asked whether 
statistical data are available regarding the parameter and, if so, whether there are a sufficient 
number of precise measurements. At this stage a distinction must be made according to 
whether the variability is spatial or temporal. In the case of spatial variability and if sufficient 
data are available, geostatistics models (e.g. Chilès and Delfiner 1999) can be used to 
represent the spatial variability and provide reliable estimators of the parameter. In the case of 
temporal variability and of sufficient available data, a unique probability distribution will be 
the appropriate representation tool. If there is a large number of imprecise data, a random set 
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can be used. But if only a little amount of data is available, and one must basically rely on 
expert knowledge, then the investigator is asked whether he can provide the support of the 
distribution describing the parameter’s variability. Should this be the case, if the user knows 
what type of distribution is suitable and can provide, based on expert knowledge, intervals for 
the parameters of the distribution (e.g. average and standard deviation), then a parametric 
probability family (represented as a p-box) can be used. Note however that the use of a p-box 
may represent a certain loss of information as the latter represents a non-parametric family of 
PDFs even if bounded by parametric ones (see Baudrit et al. 2008 for a discussion and a 
proposal for handling such imprecise parametric models). If knowledge on the distributions is 
not available, the flowchart resorts to the fuzzy interval-type representations mentioned 
previously, now supposed to represent a family of objective probabilities. In the case of 
imprecise geostatistical data, specific techniques can be used, for instance, the pioneering 
fuzzy interval approach of Bardossy et al. (1988) (see Loquin and Dubois 2010, for a survey) 
The list of tools in the flowchart, which is by no means exhaustive, is drawn from the 
uncertainty theories cited in the previous section and attempts to cover the variety of “degrees 
of precision” typically encountered in the field of environmental risks. While inherently 
incomplete, the main benefit of the proposed flowchart is to bring the user to realize that there 
is no one-all-fit-all method for representing uncertainty. All depends on the nature of the 
available information. Once appropriate representations have been selected for all uncertain 
risk model parameters, the information can be propagated using the techniques recalled in the 
next section, the choice of which depends not only on the information representation tools, 
but also on possible dependencies between model parameters.  
 
4. UNCERTAINTY PROPAGATION  
Already in the 1980’s Kaufmann and Gupta (1985) had proposed so-called “hybrid 
numbers” which simultaneously express imprecision and randomness. Later on, Cooper et al. 
(1996) used this framework to combine stochastic and subjective sources of data uncertainty 
in the estimation of risk. More recently, Guyonnet et al. (2003) use probability distributions 
for representing variability in model inputs, and fuzzy intervals when only partial information 
is available on other inputs. They proposed a propagation method, also termed “hybrid”, 
combining Monte Carlo sampling of probability distributions with fuzzy interval analysis 
(Dubois et al. 2000), thus generating a random fuzzy interval as the system output. Baudrit et 
al. (2005) identified a consistent approach for summarizing the results of this method, in the 
12 
form of a probability box (closely related to Dempster upper and lower probabilities, and 
belief functions of Shafer). Baudrit et al. (2006, 2007) proposed an alternative uncertainty 
propagation method, called the independent random set (IRS) method, where the random 
sampling procedure is applied not only to the probability distributions, but also to the fuzzy 
intervals. Couso et al. (2000) showed that this method is a conservative counterpart to the 
calculation with random quantities under stochastic independence (classical Monte Carlo 
method). Baudrit et al. (2007) showed that the IRS method yields very similar results to those 
of the hybrid method, differences being due to different hypotheses with respect to model 
parameter dependencies (Baudrit et al. 2006). Other authors directly model incomplete 
information by probability boxes and provide suitable uncertainty propagation methods 
(Williamson and Downs 1990; Regan et al. 2004).  
We recall two propagation methods, one of which will be illustrated in section 5. They are 
well suited for situations involving both epistemic and stochastic uncertainty. The first 
method (Guyonnet et al. 2003) combines the random sampling of probability distribution 
functions (PDFs) with interval analysis on the cut sets of fuzzy intervals. We consider a 
generic risk model that is a function of a certain number of parameters x1,…xn, y1, …ym: 
z = f(x1,…xn, y1, …ym),        (7) 
where z is risk model output; x1,…xn are n independent model parameters represented by 
probability distribution functions (PDFs) F1, …, Fn; y1, …ym are m model parameters 
represented by fuzzy intervals with possibility distributions π1, …, πm.  
4.1 A fuzzy Monte-Carlo method 
The so-called “hybrid” procedure of Guyonnet et al. (2003) is as follows: 
 
1. Generate n random numbers (χ1, …, χn) in [0, 1]n from a uniform distribution and 
sample the n PDF’s to obtain a realization of the n random variables: r1, … rn, where ri 
= F−1(χi). 
2. Select a possibility value λ in [0, 1] and build cut-sets of π1, …, πm at level λ yielding 
intervals Ijλ = {r, πj(r) ≥λ }. 
3. Interval calculation: calculate the Inf (least) and Sup (greatest) values of interval Z = 
f(r1, …, rn, I1λ, ..., Imλ), scanning all values located within the cut sets of each fuzzy 
set. 
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4. Consider these Inf and Sup values to be the lower and upper limits of the cut set 
containing the output z at possibility level λ. 
5. Return to step 2 and repeat steps 3 and 4 for another value of λ. The fuzzy result 
describing z is obtained from the Inf and Sup values of Z for each cut set. 
6. Return to step 1 to generate a new realization of the random variables.  
 
Note that step 3 may need a stochastic search method if the function f is not monotonic and 
its extrema are ill-known. Computations can be arranged so as to avoid redoing them for each 
λ-cut (for instance using the transformation method of Hanss 2004).  
A family of ω possibility distributions (a random fuzzy set) is thus obtained that describe 
the output value z (ω being the number of realizations of the random variables). This random 
fuzzy set can be interpreted as a standard random interval as proposed by Baudrit et al. 
(2005), namely separately collecting all intervals of the form f(r1, …, rn, I1λ, ..., Imλ) for all 
samples (χ1, …, χn, λ). 
4.2 The independent random set approach 
An alternative propagation method is based on independent random sets (called IRS; 
Baudrit et al. 2006). It exploits the fact that the theory of evidence (Shafer 1976) encompasses 
both possibility and probability theory. It is based on an extension of the Monte-Carlo scheme 
whereby sampling is performed likewise on random variables, on possibility distributions π1, 
…, πm (and p-boxes, if any input parameter representation takes such a form) associated to 
each imprecise parameter. The procedure is as follows:  
 
1. Generate n+m random numbers (χ1, …, χn+m) in [0, 1]n+m from a uniform distribution 
on [0, 1]. 
2. Sample the n PDF’s to obtain a realization of the n random variables: r1, … rn,  
3. Sample the m fuzzy intervals π1, …, πm (or p-boxes) each at a different level χn+i to 
obtain m intervals: I1, ..., Im, where Ii = {r, πi(r) ≥χn+i }. 
4. Calculate the Inf (least) and Sup (greatest) values of z = f(p1, …, pn, I1, ..., Im), using 
interval analysis, considering all values located within the intervals I1, ..., Im. 
5. Return to step 1 to generate a new realization of the random variables and the fuzzy 
sets (or p-boxes). Repeat ω times. 
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Again, a random interval is obtained. The difference between the “hybrid” and IRS 
schemes lies in the assumptions with respect to independence between model parameters. In 
the “hybrid” scheme, stochastic independence between the probabilistic variables is often 
assumed, although non-linear monotone dependency between the random variables can be 
accounted for by means of rank correlation methods (Connover and Iman 1982). Stochastic 
independence between the group of probabilistic variables and the group of possibilistic 
quantities is also assumed. But the fuzzy interval analysis in the “hybrid” scheme assumes 
that the sources supplying information related to imprecise parameters are totally dependent, 
while no link between the parameters themselves is assumed. In contrast with the second IRS 
Monte-Carlo scheme, the “hybrid” method comes down to restricting the samples (χ1, …, 
χn+m) to those of the form (χ1, …, χn, λ …,λ). On the other hand, the IRS method assumes 
independence between all information sources.  
4.3 Presentation of the results 
The output random interval is then summarized in the form of a pair of upper and lower 
cumulative probability distributions, i.e. a p-box (Baudrit et al. 2005), considering F*(θ)=Pl(x 
≤ θ) and F*(θ)=Bel(x ≤ θ), as per the theory of evidence recalled above. It evaluates the 
probability of the proposal x ≤ θ,  i.e., “the calculated risk lies below a specified target level 
θ”. The probability that this proposal is true is comprised between the degree of plausibility 
(an upper bound on probability) and the degree of belief (a lower bound on probability). 
Therefore, the lower bound Bel(x ≤ θ) gathers the imprecise evidence that asserts x ≤ θ while 
the upper bound Pl(x ≤ θ) gathers the imprecise evidence that does not contradict x ≤ θ. The 
interval [Bel(x ≤ θ), Pl(x ≤ θ)] contains all potential probability values compatible with the 
mass function m obtained from the propagation step.  
The significant advantage of standard probabilistic methods using the Monte Carlo method 
with arbitrarily selected PDFs despite incomplete/imprecise information is that a single value 
for the probability of exceeding the critical threshold θ  is obtained. This will appear more 
appealing to decision-makers dealing with environmental risks than imprecise probabilities of 
exceeding such a threshold. In fact, Bayesian scholars deny the potential of approaches like 
the above one to provide useful support for obtaining a scientific judgment about the 
unknown quantities under concern, considering that the explicit handling of ignorance on top 
of available statistical probabilities only leads to an objective description of these unknown 
quantities (Aven 2010). However it can be argued that the probability bounds at work in these 
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representations are subjective, whether or not an objective probability rules the behaviour of 
the unknown quantities: from one source or expert to another, the probability bounds will be 
different without necessarily being conflicting (Dubois 2010). 
In order to increase the acceptance of methods that account for epistemic uncertainties in 
the field of environmental or health risks, it is proposed to introduce an additional reasoning 
step in order to provide a result that is more amenable to potential users. 
 
5. A HURWICZ STYLE APPROACH TO DECISION UNDER 
PARTIAL IGNORANCE  
The classical approach to decision under uncertainty is due to Savage (1954). Decision 
under epistemic uncertainty is there opposed to “decision under risk”, where the latter 
presupposes the knowledge of precise objective probabilities of occurrence of states of nature, 
a situation that is not met in our setting. Even when such probabilities are ill-known, Savage 
has suggested that, provided some postulates of rational decision are accepted, a decision-
maker should make decisions as if he had a unique subjective probability distribution in mind 
when ranking potential decisions, the ranking being done according to the expected utility 
criterion. This view has been challenged to a large extent for at least two reasons: first the 
expected utility criterion neglects the attractiveness of sure gains against lotteries which may 
have higher expectations but where greater losses are possible as well. Second, in the face of 
partial ignorance decision makers may fail to use the same subjective probability in 
successive choices when comparing decisions in a pairwise manner (Ellsberg paradox; 
Ellsberg 1961).  
5.1 Decision Under Partial Ignorance 
Under epistemic uncertainty, the result of the risk analysis, as we described it, consists in a 
random set, typically having the form of a probability box, i.e., a pair of PDFs (F*, F*) where 
F* > F*. As pointed out above, it corresponds to a uniform mass density assigned to subsets of 
the form: 
Aλ = [F*-1(λ), F*-1(λ)] where F–1(λ) = inf{x, F(x) ≥ λ}    (8) 
In the case of discrete PDFs, as typically obtained from our algorithms, it comes down to a 
finite set of n intervals [ai, bi] each being assigned a probability weight mi, which represents 
the proportion of results of the form [ai, bi], obtained by the joint Monte-Carlo/interval 
analysis method. Comparing decisions when the uncertainty is described by a random set is 
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problematic because expected utilities will take the form of intervals, and intervals are not 
totally ordered. Likewise, probabilities of relevant events will be only known via a probability 
interval.  
A number of decision criteria have been proposed in the literature, both in economics (see 
Chateauneuf and Cohen 2009 for a survey) and in connection with Walley's imprecise 
probability theory, following pioneering works by Isaac Levi (see Troffaes 2007). There are 
basically three schools of thought: 
- Comparing set-valued utility estimations under more or less strict conditions. These 
decision rules, such as Levi’s E-admissibility usually do not result in a total ordering of 
decisions, and some scholars may consider that the problem is not fully solved then. 
Nevertheless they provide rationality constraints on the final decision. 
- Comparing point-valued estimations after selection of a « reasonable » utility value 
within the computed bounds. For instance the generalisation of the (pessimistic) 
maximin criterion of Wald proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).  
- Selecting a probability measure in the set of imprecise priors and ranking decisions 
following the corresponding expected utility. This is the approach proposed by Smets 
(2005) with his so-called pignistic probability.  
The two latter approaches lead to clear-cut best decisions but the responsibility of the choice 
of the point-valued risk measure then relies on the decision-maker. In the second approach, 
the choice of the equivalent subjective probability depends on the pair of decisions to be 
compared, while in the third approach, the subjective probability function is chosen once and 
for all.  
5.2 The confidence index 
In our setting, deciding if the output of the system under study lies beyond a critical 
threshold θ may be difficult: we have to compare the ill-known expected value: 
EV = [∑i = 1, …, n mi ai , ∑i = 1, …, n mi bi]       (9) 
to the threshold θ, or to compute an imprecise probability of violating it: 
 IP = [1 − F*(θ) , 1 − F*(θ)].         (10) 
Such an interval may baffle a decision-maker, if too wide. An important characteristic of 
the field of environmental and health risks is that public perception is one of “aversion to 
risk”. Obviously, in such a context, it would not be acceptable to use the optimistic bound 1 − 
F*(θ) on probability as the sole indicator of the acceptability of risk. Note that the optimistic 
bound will be the Bel indicator, if the event B whose likelihood is to be judged is that a risk 
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threshold θ is exceeded (“x > θ”), and Pl (Pl(Bc) = 1 – Bel(B)), if the event is Bc, i.e, that risk 
lies below the threshold θ. One might then consider that the pessimistic bound on probability 
should be used as the unique indicator of acceptability. This approach, while being 
conservative, presents the important disadvantage of ignoring all the information leading to 
less pessimistic estimates of risk. 
Insofar as a decision has to be selected, the lesson of Savage theory is that a probability 
function P ∈ P must be selected so as to account for the final ranking of decisions. In the case 
when expected utility is the ranking criterion, it enables the selection of a unique probability 
value p ∈ IP of violating the critical threshold θ, or a single expected value within the interval 
EV. These probability and expected value blend the objective available information (inducing 
the interval IP) and the attitude of the decision-maker in front of partial ignorance.  
There are three approaches for selecting a single probability function in a family thereof:  
1. Applying the Laplace principle of insufficient reason to each focal set [ai, bi], thus 
changing it into a uniformly distributed PDF Fi on [ai, bi], and using the distribution 
function F1 = ∑i = 1, …, n miFi, to compute an expected value EV1 and a violation 
probability p1 = 1 − F1(θ) . 
2. Replacing each focal set [ai, bi] with a value f(ai, bi) ∈ [ai, bi], where f is increasing in 
both places; then using the distribution function F2 induced by the probability 
assignment {( f(ai, bi), mi), i = 1, …, n}. This PDF F2 has pseudo-inverse F2–1(λ) = 
inf{x, F2(x) ≥ λ} = f(ai, bi), ∀λ∈[0, 1], where Aλ =[ai, bi] . Then the expected value 
EV2 takes the form of EV2 = ∑i = 1, …, n mi f(ai, bi). 
3. Directly selecting a PDF F3 such that F3(x) = g(F*(x), F*(x)) ∈ [F*(x), F*(x)]. 
The first method was proposed by Smets (2005) under the name “pignistic transformation” 
and axiomatically justified. It is identical to the so-called Shapley value used in cooperative 
game theory as a fairness principle for sharing benefits across members of coalitions. Beyond 
its formal appeal, its drawback in our context is that it leaves no room to a decision-maker for 
expressing his attitude in front of risk. The pignistic transformation just explains how an 
individual is likely to bet in the face of ignorance if he is forced to bet: namely using a two-
stepped procedure: 
- Bet on [ai, bi] with subjective probability mi; 
- then bet uniformly on some value within [ai, bi], as there is no reason to favor one 
value against another.  
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The second method was advocated by Jaffray (1988, 1994). Its aim is to try and preserve 
the linearity of the expected utility. The idea is to assign a preference relation on belief 
functions on states of nature in place of a set of probability distributions (lotteries), and apply 
the axioms of decision under risk to a functional that, to any belief function Bel, assigns a 
precise expected value EVBel, still obeying the famous independence and continuity axioms of 
decision theory (after Herstein and Milnor 1953), which ensure the linearity of the expected 
utility, i.e.: 
EVaBel+(1-a)Bel ’= aEVBel + (1-a)EVBel’       (11) 
In fact this approach is the same as the traditional Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
approach to decision under risk, where epistemic uncertainty is accounted for by replacing the 
set of states of nature by the set of epistemic states of the decision maker, each possible 
epistemic state being modeled by a set of states of nature, one of which is the right one. 
Jaffray considers a belief function as an objective probability over epistemic states. The 
quantity f([ai, bi]) is then like the equivalent (subjectively perceived) risk level of the 
epistemic state [ai, bi]. 
Moreover he adds a further dominance axiom enforcing the monotonic increasingness of f 
(hence EVBel) with respect to the following partial ordering between intervals (viewed as 
random sets with mass assignment 1):  
Dominance axiom: [ai, bi] ≥ [aj, bj] if and only if ai ≥ aj and bi ≥ bj. 
Then he proves that f([ai, bi]) is of the form f(ai, bi) and EVBel is of the form of criterion 
EV2= ∑i = 1, …, n mi f(ai, bi) above, that is, the precise expectation only depends on the value of 
the end-points of focal intervals. Interestingly, the pignistic transformation is also linear with 
respect to the convex combination of belief functions. The difference is that the choice of a 
value f(ai, bi) to which weight mi is assigned (in method 2) is replaced by a uniformly 
distributed probability in Smets’ method. To make the latter more flexible, one could as well 
use any probability measure on [ai, bi], that reflects the attitude of the decision-maker when 
the latter only knows that the real value of the parameter (e.g. pollution index) lies between ai 
and bi (in agreement with the Bayesian approach).  
The third method is more in line with so-called credibility theory developed by Liu (2007) 
who reconstructs a PDF from a pair of possibility and necessity measures (Π, Ν) as:  
F(x) = (Π(x≤r) +  Ν( x≤r) )/2.         (12) 
Our third proposal for computing F3 generalizes this procedure to belief-plausibility 
function pairs.  
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In order to practically account for the decision-maker attitude, it is usual to introduce an 
optimism index αi such that if the value of the (say) pollution index is only known to belong 
to [ai, bi], the value considered as reasonably optimistic by the decision-maker is the average: 
 f(ai, bi) = αi ai +(1 –αi) bi        (13) 
This approach, which is based on earlier work by Hurwicz (1951), thus proposes to compute a 
single indicator as a weighted average of focal element bounds. It achieves a trade-off 
between optimistic and pessimistic estimates. In the decision theory tradition f(ai, bi) is 
viewed as the certainty-equivalent of an uncertain situation whose output is ai with probability 
αi and bi with probability 1 − αi. Under this view, the original random set is replaced by a 
standard probability measure P2 obtained by assigning each probability weight mi to risk 
model output values αi ai +(1 –αi) bi, i = 1, …, n.  
In the third method, each interval [ai, bi] would be replaced by the probability function P3i 
yielding ai with probability αi and bi with probability 1 − αi. Its PDF can be expressed as:  
Fi(r) = αiΠ i(x ≤ r) + (1−α i)Ν i( x ≤ r),      (14) 
where Boolean possibility and necessity measures Πi and Νi derive from the interval [ai, bi], 
following Eqns. (3) and (4). The probability measure P3 thus obtained from the whole random 
set can be defined as follows: P3= ∑i = 1, …, n mi P3i .   
In practice, a single value α will be used to represent the decision-maker’s attitude towards 
uncertainty. Then, for methods 2 and 3 we respectively get: 
F2-1(λ) = α F*-1(λ) +(1 –α) F*-1(λ), ∀λ∈(0, 1]     (15) 
F3(x) = α F*(x) +(1 –α) F*(x)        (16) 
i.e. F2 is obtained by taking the weighted average of upper and lower bounds of each cut of 
the p-box, while F3 is obtained by the weighted average of the upper and lower fractiles. Note 
that the two PDFs significantly differ, but they have the same expected value:  
EV2 = EV3= α∑i = 1, …, n mi ai + (1 - α) ∑i = 1, …, n mi bi     (17) 
However their variance is very different. In particular F3 has a larger variance than the 
ones of the upper and lower distributions, while F2 has a variance that is a trade-off between 
them. For instance if the probability box is an interval, the second approach suggests that 
randomness may be absent and F2 proposes a substitute deterministic value. On the contrary 
the PDF F3 has variance α(1−α)(a−b)2. This feature makes the choice of the second (Jaffray) 
method preferable to the third one as F2 has a shape more in conformity to the available 
information. We refer to this PDF as a “Confidence Index” in the sequel. The same expected 
value is also obtained when α = 1/2 with the pignistic transform F1): 
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It must be fully recognized that the choice of weight α is subjective. However, this 
subjectivity is only introduced at the decision-making step in the form of a single PDF used as 
a sensible reference displayed along with the pessimistic and optimistic outputs. This is very 
different from displaying a single distribution obtained by propagating single distributions 
introduced at the beginning of the risk analysis step. According to the Bayesian usage, PDFs 
allegedly representing the state of knowledge of experts must be selected for any parameter, 
even in the presence of incomplete/imprecise information. The Bayesian credo makes sense at 
the decision level, according to the declared intention of its founder (Savage), and the 
approach proposed here does not really contradict this view. It only postulates that in the end 
the decision is made according to expected utility of some probability function. What appears 
debatable is to claim that one must introduce a unique subjective probability function, each 
and every time incomplete information of some kind is met, while no decision is at stake (e.g. 
when just collecting information). Nothing in the Bayesian doctrine prescribes such an 
extreme view.  
Our basic assumption is that the selection of this probability function by an expert makes 
more sense at the very end of the risk analysis chain because available information should be 
faithfully propagated up until that point. If this information is considered to be insufficient by 
the expert, he may decide to collect more. If the information is incomplete but no data 
collection is possible, then a scientific judgment must take place anyway, and our confidence 
index can contribute to it. The potential advantages of the proposed approach are illustrated in 
the next section. 
 
6. ILLUSTRATION AND DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of this application is to illustrate the use of the “Confidence Index” 
defined previously. The choice of the term “Confidence Index” is borrowed from the field of 
meteorology (WMO 2008). The meteorological community has extensive experience with 
respect to predicting natural events and also of communicating on these predictions with the 
general public. It is therefore significant that meteorologists should have adopted the term 
“Confidence Index” to communicate on the uncertainty relative to their predictions, as the 
term holds value both from a scientific and sociological viewpoint: scientific because it avoids 
referring to any particular uncertainty paradigm (probabilistic, possibilistic, etc.); sociological 
because the notion of “confidence” has positive connotations. This same term is gaining 
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acceptance in other fields, for example traffic forecasting (Danech-Pajouh and Sauvadet 
2003). 
The illustration relies on a generic health risk calculation for the case of individual 
exposure to a chlorinated organic solvent (1,1,2-Trichloroethane) via the consumption of 
contaminated drinking water. Toxicologists consider that 1,1,2-tricholorethane is a “no-
threshold”, potentially carcinogenic substance: exposure generates a risk whatever the level of 
exposure (e.g. EPA 1987). The chronic carcinogenic toxicological reference value for this 
substance is a unit excess risk (UER), namely, a probability (or expected value) of excess 
cancer per unit daily dose, determined based on dose-response relationships (an oral slope 
factor; EPA 1987). For an exposed individual, we calculate an individual excess risk (IER) as 
the product of the absorbed dose and the unit excess risk. The calculated excess risk can then 
be compared to a threshold of tolerable individual excess risk defined by the health authority. 
Individual excess risk and absorbed dose are calculated from (EPA 1989):  
UERDIER ⋅=   and: 
ATBW
EDEFCID ⋅
⋅⋅⋅=      (18) 
where: D = absorbed dose (mg pollutant absorbed per Kg body weight and per day), I = 
quantity of water ingested per day (L/d), C = concentration of 1,1,2-trichloroethane in 
drinking water (mg/L), EF = exposure frequency (d/yr), ED = exposure duration (yr), BW = 
body weight (Kg), AT = averaging time (d), UER = Unit Excess Risk (expected excess cancer 
per unit dose; (mg/Kg-d)-1), IER = Individual Excess Risk (expected excess cancer resulting 
from dose D). 
The representation of the problem parameters requires two modes of representation 
described previously: probability and possibility distributions. It is assumed that there are 
sufficient drinking water concentration measurements (Ci) to allow the identification of a 
statistically representative probability density function for this unknown quantity. 
Concentration in drinking water is described by a triangular probability density function of 
mode 10 μg/l and lower and upper values 5 and 20 μg/l respectively. It is also assumed that 
statistical data regarding population residence times are available such that the exposure 
duration (DE) can also be represented by a unique probability distribution: a triangular 
probability density function of mode 30 years and lower and upper limits 10 and 50 years 
respectively. Body weight and averaging time are taken as constants (respectively 70 kg and 
70 years) in order to provide a generic character to the exposed individual but also to be 
consistent with the toxicological reference value (UER) defined for a lifelong exposure (taken 
as 70 years). All other parameters (rate of ingestion, exposure frequency, unit excess risk) are 
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represented by triangular possibility distributions presented in Table 1, due to assumed 
epistemic uncertainties reflecting a lack of information. For the oral slope factor, the core is 
taken from EPA (1987), while the lower and the upper bounds were proposed by experts. 
Note that in practice, examination of the experimental data that led to the EPA 
recommendation may help identify more suitable values. 
The individual excess risk threshold, defined by the Health Authority, is taken as 10-5: it is 
an expected number of excess cancers for an exposed individual. This threshold can also be 
thought of as implying that the Health Authority accepts that in a population of 105 identical 
individuals receiving precisely the same dose, one individual (expected value) would develop 
a cancer related to the exposure. We are interested in the probability of exceeding (or, 
conversely, remaining below) this threshold. For the hybrid calculation, fuzzy intervals were 
discretized into 10 cut-sets, probability distributions into 50 classes, and 100 iterations were 
used for the Monte Carlo random sampling. The results of the calculation are presented in Fig. 
2. The distance between the Pl and Bel functions is a consequence of the incompleteness of 
information relative to the three parameters in Table 1. Also shown in Fig. 2 for comparison 
purposes, is the result of a Monte Carlo calculation performed assuming probability density 
functions for all model parameters, with total stochastic independence. Probability density 
functions for the three ill-informed parameters have the same shapes as the fuzzy intervals in 
Table 1.  
With respect to the acceptability of the calculated risk, in the case of the Monte Carlo 
calculation the answer is quite straightforward. The probability of lying below the threshold 
defined by the health authority is 95%, implying that there is only a 5% chance of exceeding 
the threshold. Such a level of risk might seem acceptable but it is reminded that the result of 
this calculation is biased by the fact that unique PDFs were selected in presence of incomplete 
information. In the case of the hybrid calculation, results suggest that the probability of lying 
below the threshold is comprised between 62% (lower bound; Bel) and 100% (upper bound; 
Pl). In this case, there are two possible courses of action. One option could be to decide that 
the distance between the upper and lower probability bounds is too great, and therefore, the 
epistemic uncertainty regarding certain parameters should be reduced by performing 
additional measurements. But in many situations it will not be possible, for reasons of budget 
and time constraints, to follow this line. It is therefore proposed to compute the “Confidence 
Index” defined in the previous section, as shown in Fig. 3 where a weight α = 1/3 was used, 
implying that more weight (2/3) is given to the pessimistic probability bound, than to the 
optimistic bound (1/3). In a context of aversion to risk, it would seem normal to privilege the 
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pessimistic limit, but without completely obliterating the optimistic one. Comparison with the 
risk threshold of 10-5 suggests that the calculated risk is below the threshold with a 
Confidence Index of 80%. The decision-maker must then decide whether or not this level of 
confidence is sufficient to accept the risk. 
It may be of interest in practice to compare the results obtained by the standard Bayesian 
approach and the results obtained by our approach, in order to see if the subjective probability 
assessments on input parameters lead to an optimistic or a pessimistic view of the actual risk. 
It may also bring some insight for a better choice of the optimism index. However such a 
comparison may be delusive as the subjective input distributions are exploited as if they 
expressed variability (by the Monte-Carlo simulation), and the output variance will be all the 
smaller as many ill-informed input parameters will be handled in this way. So, while the 
choice of probabilistic substitute to partial knowledge may look easier to perform on input 
parameters (for which expertise exists) than on the risk model output itself, the reduction of 
uncertainty due to the probabilistic simulation technique will be more significant than if the 
ill-informed parameters are modelled by set-like entities propagated in the interval analysis 
style and a confidence index is derived from the output p-box (this is patent comparing the 
pure Monte-Carlo result on Figure 2 and the confidence index on Figure 3). 
7. CONCLUSION 
The way information regarding risk model parameters is represented in risk assessments 
should be consistent with the nature of this information. In particular the confusion between 
stochastic and epistemic uncertainty should be avoided so that the results of risk assessments 
adequately reflect available information. In this paper we first review methods for 
representing and propagating uncertain information in risk assessments and then propose a 
flowchart as an aid in the choice of tools for representing uncertain information. This 
flowchart highlights the idea that the important question at the data collection step is “what do 
I know?” rather than “what probability should I assign?” and also that no single information 
representation tool can be applied to all types of information. 
This paper also focuses on a potential shortcoming of existing joint propagation methods in 
a context of decision-making, i.e. that they yield imprecise levels of probability that a (risky) 
proposition is true or not. Several approaches for circumventing this shortcoming are 
presented and one approach is selected, based on Jaffray’s generalization of Hurwicz criterion 
to belief functions. It selects a subjective probability measure (dubbed “Confidence Index”, a 
name borrowed from common practice in meteorology). This probability measure, reflecting 
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the decision-maker’s attitude with respect to ambiguity and risk, is applied to an illustrative 
example. The proposed approach introduces the decision-maker subjectivity at the final 
decision-making stage, which is more easily justified than when modeling input information. 
Indeed our method does not mask epistemic uncertainty, while a full-fledged Bayesian 
approach to modeling all input parameters runs the risk of confusing epistemic uncertainty 
with stochastic variability, both being entangled in the unique distribution obtained by the 
propagation step. Our proposal is to represent epistemic uncertainty and stochastic variability 
by distinct tools, preserving this distinction after the propagation step, while offering the 
decision-maker a practical way to express a level of aversion to risk, thus converging to a 
more easily interpretable (subjective) risk probability. It is felt that the risk assessor should 
attempt to forward the available information to the decision-maker as faithfully as possible, so 
that the range of possible outcomes be known. If this range is judged too wide, then action 
might be taken in order to reduce uncertainties in model input parameters (e.g. via 
measurement). Such an analysis can never be carried out from a Monte Carlo simulation 
performed using postulated PDFs on input parameters, as there is no way of distinguishing, in 
the variance of computed output, the actual variability resulting from true stochastic 
randomness from apparent variability due to subjective probability judgments.  
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Table 1. Parameter values used for the illustration 







Concentration in water μg/L Probability 5 10 20 
Ingestion L/d Fuzzy interval 1 1.5 2.5 
Exposure frequency d/year Fuzzy interval 200 250 350 
Exposure duration Years Probability 10 30 50 
Oral slope factor (mg/Kg/d)-1 Fuzzy interval 2 x 10-2 5.7 x 10-2  10-1 
30 













































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. Result of the application risk calculation 
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the confidence index for a value α = 1/3 
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